Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 35
Issue 2 Volume 35, Number 2 (Summer 1997)

Article 2

4-1-1997

Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and
Compulsory Licences at International Law
Michael Halewood

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj

Article

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Citation Information
Halewood, Michael. "Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licences
at International Law." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35.2 (1997) : 243-287.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol35/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory
Licences at International Law
Abstract
For decades, industry lobbyists and governments have been mounting pressure on other countries to
offer stronger protection for foreign owned intellectual property. This paper seeks to sow dissent among
those who feel that the NAFTA and TRIPS agreements represent the triumph of strong intellectual
property rights over domestic policy-making alternatives. Focusing on patent law, in particular, this article
argues that there are a wide range of policy options open to patent granting countries which both
circumscribe patent holder's rights and comply with TRIPS and NAFTA. More specifically, the author
argues that TRIPS and NAFTA signatories continue to enjoy relatively broad discretion to legislate
compulsory licensing and mandatory local working conditions.

Keywords
Patent laws and legislation; North American Free Trade Agreement (1992 December 17); Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994 April 15); Compulsory licensing of patents

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol35/iss2/2

REGULATING PATENT HOLDERS:
LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS
AND COMPULSORY LICENCES AT
INTERNATIONAL LAW©
BY MICHAEL HALEWOOD*

For decades, industry lobbyists and governments have
been mounting pressure on other countries to offer
stronger protection for foreign owned intellectual
property. This paper seeks to sow dissent among those
who feel that the NVAFTAand Tnps agreements represent
the triumph of strong intellectual property rights over
domestic policy-making alternatives. Focusing on
patent law, in particular, this article argues that there
are a wide range of policy options open to patent
granting countries which both circumscribe patent
More
holder's rights and comply with 7mps and NAFTA.
and NAFTA
specifically, the author argues that TRIPS
signatories continue to enjoy relatively broad discretion
to legislate compulsory licensing and mandatory local
working conditions.

Depuis des d~cennies, les groupes de pression et les
gouvemements des pays industrialists intensifient les
pression sur les autres pays afin qu'ils offrent une
meilleure protection pour les titulaires 6trangers de
droits de propri6t6 intellectuelle Cet article vise a
soulever le d~saccord entre ceux qui opinent que
d'AL NA et I'APic reprdsentant le triomphe des droits
des titulaires de brevets par rapports aux protagonistes
des solutions politiques internes. Entre autres, la
pr~sente discussion soutient qu'il existe, conformment
ii I'ALtNA et l'AnpIc, de nombreuses options politiques
pouvant 6tre adopt~es par les pays qui accordent des
brevets, ayant pour effet de limiter les droits de ces
titulaires. Particuliarement, l'auteur examine la
possibilit6 pour les signataires de I'ALtNA et de rADPIc
de jouir d'une marge de manoeuvre quant h l'adoption
des licences et des conditions de travail obligatoires.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to establish that domestic patent legislation that
requires "local working," and creates relatively wide powers for granting
compulsory licences, would not be in contravention of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights1 or the North
American Free TradeAgreement.2
The argument is a timely one, because all around the globe,
governments are changing-or being pressured to change-their
domestic patent legislation in favour of foreign patentees, including
loosening or eliminating local working requirements, and severely

restricting their use of compulsory licences. 3 Working requirements and

1Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual PropertyRights, being Annex IC to the
FinalAct and Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,15 December 1993, (1994), 33
I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: GAiT Secretariat, 1994).
2North American Free TradeAgreement"between the Government of Canada, the Government of
the United Mexican States; and the Government of the United States of America, 17 December 1992,
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2 [hereinafter NAFIA] (entered into force 1 January 1994).
3 Canada's relatively broad powers for granting compulsory licences were curtailed in two
successive legislative amendments: An Act to Amend the PatentAct and to provide for certain matters
in relation thereto, S.C. 1987, c. 41; and PatentAct Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2. The
controversy in Canada regarding compulsory licensing was recently revived in the Standing
Committee on Industry's Review of Section 14 of the PatentAct Amendment S.C. 1993, c. 2. See
Canada, House of Commons, Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on Industry: Review of Section
14 of the PatentAct Amendment 1992, 2d Sess., 35th Par]. (Chair: David Walker) Issue No. 7 23
April 1997 (Meeting No. 66). An overview of the changes regarding compulsory licensing in
Canada, and the pressure brought by multinational .pharmaceutical producers, and U.S. treaty
negotiators is provided in A. Rotstein, "Intellectual Property and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: The Case of Pharmaceuticals" in K. Nair & A. Kumar, eds., Intellectual PropertyRights
(New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1994) 221. Similarly, New Zealand repealed its compulsory licensing
provisions in 1992: see J.Wechkin, "Drug Price Regulation and Compulsory Licensing for
Pharmaceutical Patents: The New Zealand Connection" (1995) 5 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 237, for a
full account. China has restricted the conditions under which it can grant compulsory licences: see
D. Hill & J. Evans, "Chinese Patent Law: Recent Changes Align China More Closely with Modem
International Practice" (1994) 27 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.& Econ. 359. Thailand, which had very strong
local working requirements and liberal compulsory licensing policies has responded to foreign
pressure to restrict its use and enforcement of those provisions: see H. Kwon, "Patent Protection
and Technology Transfer in the Developing World: The Thailand Experience" (1995) 28 Geo.
Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 567. See also J.Blatt & P. Miller, "Preparing for the Pacific Century:
Fostering Technology Transfer in Southeast Asia" (1996) 3 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 235, note
14, for more details regarding Thai working requirements. India has also drastically reduced the
circumstances under which compulsory licenses can be granted. See B.K. Keayla, "Product
Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry" in Nair & Kumar, eds., 151; S.L. Rao, "The Indian
Health Care Industry: Role of Intellectual Property Rights" in Nair & Kumar, eds., 175; and M.
Adelman & S. Baldia "Prospects & Limits of the Patent Protection in the TRips Agreement: The
Case of India" (1996) 29 Vand. J.Transnat'l L. 507. Regarding Mexico, see R. Baca, "Compulsory
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compulsory licences are important mechanisms by which a patent
granting country can compel foreign patentees to transfer technology to
within its jurisdiction. "Local working" refers to the condition some
countries impose on patentees that their patented product or process
must be used or produced in the patent granting country. This condition
has the effect of forcing foreign patentees to situate production facilities
within the patent granting country. Such transfers of technology are
desirable from the patent granting country's point of view because they
contribute to a variety of public policy goals such as employment
creation, industrial and technological capacity building, national balance
of payments, and economic independence. "Compulsory licensing"
refers to the practice of governments allowing parties other than the
original patentees to exploit patented products and processes. In such
cases, the patentee is forced to grant a licence to a third-party licensee to
exploit the patented product or process, in return for which the patentee
generally receives a royalty payment at a rate set by legislative fiat.
Justifications for the grant of compulsory licences vary considerably
between countries. Perhaps the most important use of compulsory
licences is as a remedy for patent-holder abuses such as "non-working,"
or the maintenance of artificially high prices for patent protected
commodities. As far as their effect on the transfer of technology is
concerned, the immediate advantage of compulsory licensing is obvious:
compulsory licences allow third parties to exploit on a local basis that
technology which the original patentees failed to introduce into the
country in the first place, or failed to use once it was introduced. In the
absence of controls such as compulsory licensing and mandatory local
working, patent granting countries are left in the unenviable position of
having to trust that foreign patent holders will decide on the basis of their
own self interests to transfer technology to within their jurisdictions.
Despite the evident advantages of compulsory licensing and
mandatory working requirements from a nation-building point of view,
many commentators take the position that signatory states to NAFTA
and/or TRIPS have forfeited, or severely limited their ability to invoke
Licensing in the 1990s: The Aftermath of NAFTA and the 1991 Industrial Property Law" (1995) 28 J.
Vand. Transnat'l L. 33.
For an excellent analysis of American efforts to strengthen intellectual property in a number of
countries, including, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and the Former
Yugoslavia: see C. O'Neal Taylor, "The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System" (1997) 30 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 209. See also, M.
Getlan, "TRips and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution"
(1995) 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 173, for more detail regarding Brazilian, Chinese, and Thai s. 301
cases, and the involvement of the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.
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this effect

is generally based on two claims.

The first claim is that

NAFTA

and

TRiPs preclude

any legislation that

requires national "working" of patents. Accordingly, "working" can be
satisfied completely by importing the patented product into the patent
granting country. "Working" therefore, has been redefined and
diminished to the extent that it no longer serves to guarantee the
transfer of anything but finished commodities.

The second claim is that

NAFTA

and

TRIPs

drastically restrict the

conditions under which states may grant compulsory licences. Many
commentators and patent rights advocates propound that compulsory
licensing is now governed exclusively by articles 1709:10 and 31 of NAFTA
and TRIPS respectively and that under those articles, compulsory licensing
must be severely constrained. If they are correct, the ability of states to
utilize compulsory licensing in order to foster technology transfers is
undermined.
I will argue that both claims are inaccurate.
In Parts II and III, I argue that domestic law requiring mandatory
working (Part II) and compulsory licensing (Part III) would not

contradict the substantive provisions of the NA PTA and TRIPs agreements.
These arguments involve a historical review of the rise and fall of both
mandatory licensing and "working" in international law. They also
involve interpretations of NAFTA and TRIPs that are harmonious with the
earlier ParisConvention for the Protectionof IndustrialProperty,1967.4
In Part IV, I examine the possibility that developing countries
may be in a stronger legal position than developed countries to justify
invoking compulsory licensing and local working requirements, based on
an analysis of the Convention on Biological Diversity.5 I will ultimately
argue however, that the CBD does little to bolster the legal position of
developing countries with respect to the possibility of their invoking
compulsory licensing and mandatory working requirements.
It is not my intention to engage the well rehearsed argument that
patents will ultimately be most effective at disseminating technology only
once they are accorded the strongest possible protection, or, in other

4 ParisConventionfor the Protectionof IndustrialPropertyof March 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 107,
as revised at Brussels on 14 December 1900, at Washington on 2 June 1911, at the Hague on 6
November 1925, at London on 2 June 1934, at Lisbon on 31 October 1958 and at Stockholm on 14
July 1967 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. My analysis focuses on the revisions to art. 5 of the Paris
Convention. For ease of reference, these revisions have been reproduced in the Appendix, below.
5 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Convention on Biodiversity, 5
June 1992,31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD].
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words, that foreign patentees will not risk transferring their technologies
to other countries until they know their technology is safe from being
copied. The logical conclusion of this argument is that, because both
mandatory local working and compulsory licensing erode the overall
strength of patent protection, they will ultimately undermine whatever
incentives might exist to transfer technology in the first place. This
argument may or may not be accurate; it is not within the competence of
this article to evaluate. Instead, this article starts with the premise that
states may, for whatever reasons, want to invoke legislation that allows
them to interfere with the international market forces to promote
technology transfers to within their borders.
Finally, it must be noted that the importance of compulsory
licensing and mandatory working is increased by the fact that both TRIPS
and NAFTA extend patent protection to subject matter that previously was
not protected in many countries. Pharmaceuticals are perhaps the most
controversial (and profitable) new subject matter to be included within
the scope of these agreements.6 Some countries have been successful in
developing national pharmaceutical industries as a result of domestic
producers' ability to produce and sell pharmaceuticals that are patented
in other countries. 7 Domestic legislation prohibiting such use threatens
to undermine these local industries, and leave the market open to supply
by foreign patentees. In this situation, at the very least, local working
requirements and compulsory licensing could be used to ensure that at
least some technology equivalent to that which was previously used by
domestic producers continues to be exploited within the patent granting
country, even though the right to supply the local markets may have
shifted from nationally based suppliers to foreign-based multinationals.

6 As of 1992, the following countries did not allow patents for pharmaceutical compounds or
compositions: Argentina; Brazil; Egypt; Ghana; Honduras; Hungary; India; Iran; Iraq; Kuwait;
Lebanon; Libya; Monaco; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Syria; Tangier Zone; Thailand; Tunisia; and
Turkey. See M. Gollin, "An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiversity Prospecting"
in Biodiversity Prospecting.Using Genetic Resourcesfor SustainableDevelopment (Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute, 1993) 159 at 169.
7

Adelman & Baldia, supra note 3 at 525-28.
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II. THE MANDATORY WORKING REQUIREMENT
A. "Local"or "National"Working Defined
"Local working" and "national working" are synonymous. Both
terms refer to the requirement that the patentee must manufacture the
patented product, or apply the patented process, within the patent
granting country. By requiring local, or national working, the patent
granting country forces the patentee to transfer the patented technology,
or the technology needed to produce the patented product, into the
country.
B. The PositionAgainst Local Working Pursuantto TRIPS andNAFTA
Article 27:1 of TRIPS (entitled "Patentable Subject Matter") and
article 1709:7 of NAFTA (untitled) state in identical language that:
"patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination ... whether products are imported or locally produced."8
Several commentators have taken the position that these articles
preclude any country from invoking a local working requirement, or, to
the same practical end, that the articles redefine "working" to include
8 The full text of TutPs, art. 27, supra note 1, states:
1.Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below, patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. [FN5] Subject
to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article,
patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced [footnote omitted].
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The
provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be reviewed four years after the entry into force of
the Agreement Establishingthe MTO.
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the possibility of being satisfied by importation alone. 9 In either case, it
follows that any legislation requiring local working would be in
contravention of TRIPS and/or NAFTA.
C. The Argument in Favourof Local Working Pursuantto
TRIPS and NAFTA
I argue, however, that one cannot deduce from the fact that TRIPS
and NAFTA recognize imports as "patentable subject matter," that imports
per se must always satisfy working requirements.
This argument proceeds in two stages. The first stage involves a
historical review of patent law. Here, I will establish that, for
approximately one hundred years prior to NAFTA and TRIPS, international
patent law simultaneously recognized both the concept that patented
subject matter could be imported, and the concept that governments had
the right to impose local working. Most importantly, international law
embodied in the Paris Convention recognized the concepts to be
complementary. In short, patented subject matter could be imported,
just not in sufficient quantities to threaten the effective local working of
the patent.
The second stage involves a review of relevant TRIPS and NAFTA
provisions. I will establish that nothing in either agreement alters the
historically complementary relationship between patent importation and
local working. Given that both NAFTA and TRIPS (to differing degrees)
require continued observance of the prior Paris Convention, I will
conclude that articles 1709:7 and 27:1 respectively do no more than
repeat the historically well-established principle that patented material

9 See for example, K.H. Jordan, "International Application of a Domestic Intellectual
Property Protection Strategy: Extending a Predatory Litigation Strategy to the European
Community" (1995) 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 373 at 389-400; Adelman &
Baldia, supra note 3 at 517; Baca, supranote 3 at 48; M. Doane, "TRIPS and International Intellectual
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology" (1994) 9 Am. U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y 465 at
479; J. Masterson, "Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in International Transactions" (1994)
863 Prac. L. Inst. 333 at 347; P. Knudsen, "NAFTA's Impact on Rights and Remedies Under U.S.
Patent Law" (1994) 7 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 1 at 4; C. Levy, "When Sovereignties May
Collide-Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Intellectual Property
Area: An American Perspective" (1994) 20 Can-U.S. L.J. 185 at 188-89; and S. Oddi, "Natural
Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism' (1996) 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 415 at 451.
See also Re Compulsory PatentLicenses: E.C. Commission v United Kingdom & Italy (1992), 2
C.M.L.R. 709 (E.C.J), where the court held that art. 5(a) of the ParisConvention, 1967, was not
sufficient to override the later EEC provisions that imports must be completely free of restrictions
within the Eu, and that therefore, within the Eu, importspersemust satisfy the work requirement.
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can be imported in limited quantities, and that they do not preclude the
possibility of legislated local working.
1. History: the earliest patents
Prior to being made the subject of legislation, patents were
granted by virtue of royal and state prerogative. 10 The first such patents
were granted in the Italian city states in the early 14th century. 1) Patents
spread throughout Europe thereafter, primarily as a tool to attract
foreign craftspeople to practise their arts in different jurisdictions.1 2
Some of the earliest English patents, for example, were granted to
foreigners to employ their crafts in England to produce and supply the
English market with salt, silk, textiles, mining, metallurgy, and
ordinance.13
The earliest discovered patent legislation, the Venetian PatentAct
of 1474, required the active exploitation of patents; otherwise, they were
cancelled by the Venetian state.1 4 Likewise, the English Statute of
Monopolies, 1623 mandated the working of the patent grant.15 The
American Patent Act of 1790, provided what are now referred to as
"importation patents," which gave Americans monopoly rights to import
foreign technology, without any obligation to protect foreign inventors'
rights.16 It has been held that, "as far as the American Patent Act is
concerned, there can be no doubt but that its primary raisond'6tre was to
give an incentive for working new inventions locally." 1 7 The French
Patent Law of 1791 also granted importation patents to work foreign
inventions in France. In addition, the PatentLaw revoked French patent

10 P. Meinhardt, Inventions,Patents and Monopoly (London: Stevens & Sons, 1946) at 43.
11 C. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660-1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 11.
12 Ibid.
13

Ibid at 12.

14

Ibid. at 11.
15 U. Anderfelt, InternationalPatent Legislation and Developing Countries (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) at 7.
16 C. Twinomukunzi, "The International Patent System-a Third World Perspective" (1982)
22 Indian J. Int'l L. 31 at 42.
17

Anderfelt, supranote 15 at 13.
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grants if inventors attained a foreign patent in a subject matter originally
patented in France.18
By the middle of the nineteenth century, most industrialized
countries had passed patent related legislation. As the discussion above
indicates, patent law served, for the most part, to bolster domestic
industrialization and provided very little by way of protection for foreign
patents. 19
2. History: ParisConvention, 1883 to the Stockholm Revision, 1967
In 1883, the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property,
produced the Paris Convention.20 This was the first multilateral treaty
negotiation to standardize the treatment of intellectual property on an
international scale.2 1 For the purposes of this paper, however, the most
important development was the correlative treatment of 1) the local
working requirement, and 2) the importation of patented material.
Article 5(1) of the Paris Convention, 188322 stated that
importation of patented articles "shall not entail forfeiture of the
patent." Article 5(2), however, stated: "Nevertheless, the patentee shall
remain under the obligation to exploit his patent in accordance with the
laws of the country into which he introduces the patent."23
Prior to the recognition that importation would not entail
forfeiture, some countries' legislation stipulated that a patentee was not
allowed to import any of the patented material, despite the fact that the
patent was for the most part being worked locally. In such cases, the
patent was revoked; no less extreme remedy existed at that time.
Compulsory licensing had not yet been introduced, as will be discussed
in Part III, below. Article 5(1), therefore, was designed to end what was
widely felt to be an abuse of the working requirement-forfeiture on the
basis of some importation. There is nothing in the Paris Convention, or
in any of the legal historical commentary regarding the section, to
18

Ibid. at 15.

19

Ibid. at 65-66.

20

Hereinafter ParisConvention, 1883, supra note 4 and Appendix, below.

21 The United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (uMPIw) served
as the Secretariat of the ParisConvention until 1970, when it was replaced by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (wiwo).
22
Supra note 4 and Appendix, below.
23

Ibid.
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suggest that article 5(1) redefined "working" to include the possibility of
being satisfied by 100 per cent imports. Edith Tilton Penrose cites the
following passage from a report by the "French section" in a preliminary
negotiating round of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property
in 1878 as the clearest statement of the compromise inscribed in article

5(1) and (2):
There are two possibilities: one, that the patentee introduces articles and manufactures

abroad in such small quantities that it does not interfere with serious exploitation of the
invention in the country where the patent was taken out; the other that the importation
takes place on a large scale and consequently there is no working, or at any rate only a
for failure to work can be enforced and that
mock working. In the latter case, forfeiture 24
will be sufficient to protect national industry.

As early as 1883, therefore, there was an international convention
which recognized that 1) imported subject matter, and 2) the possibility
of laws requiring local working, were complimentary.
The ParisConvention was subject to six subsequent revisions over
the course of 115 years. At the most recent revision conference, held in
Stockholm, in 1967, article 5(A)(2)25 was altered to read, "Each country
... shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant
of compulsory licences to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example,
failure to work." Georg Bodenhausen, who was the Director of the
United International Bureau for the Protection of International
Property at the time of the 1967 revision, confirmed that "work" in the
1967 version meant the actual use of the patent within the patent
granting country:
The member states are also free to define what they understand by 'failure to work.'
Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean working it industrially, namely, by
manufacture of the patented product, or industrial application of a patented process.

Thus, importation or sale of the patented article, or of the article manufactured by a
patented process, will not normally be regarded as 'working' the patent. 2 6

Throughout the 114 years of the Paris Convention, two
fundamental principles have remained virtually unchanged: 1) that
importation will not entail forfeiture; and 2) that member countries may

24 See E.T. Penrose, The Economics of the InternationalPatent System (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1951) at 76.
25 Previously art. 5(2) of the ParisConvention, 1883, supra note 4 and Appendix, below.
26 G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the ParisConvention for the Protectionof
IndustrialProperty,asRevised at Stockholm in 1967 (Geneva: BIRPI, 1968) at 71.
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pass legislation to mandate local working within the patent granting
country.27
a) The relationshipof the Paris Convention to TRIPS and NAFTA
The inclusion of intellectual property rights in both NFrTA and
in particular, was controversial. The controversy was characterized
by a small group of developed countries (led by the United States)
pushing for the inclusion of intellectual property in the Uruguay Round,
and less-developed countries arguing that intellectual property should
continue to be dealt with under the World Intellectual Property
GA7t

29
Organization (wIpo) 28 and the Paris Convention.
A variety of factors led to the American decision to try to shift the
administration of international intellectual property law away from wIPo
and into the GATT framework: Among the principal factors were:
frustration with efforts by the "Group of 77" (a coalition of developingcountries within wiPo) to weaken international patent protection in the
name of promoting technology transfers;3 0 lack of adequate dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanisms; 3 1 the highly politicized nature
.of wiPo negotiations;3 2 and a lack of minimum standards of intellectual

property protection. 33

27 One limit to this legislative freedom came in the form of the Brussels Revision, 1990, art.
5(3bis), stating that member countries could not pass legislation authorizing forfeiture until three
years after the filing of an application for a patent. The Lisbon Revision, 1958, strengthened this
limitation, stating that a member could not grant a compulsory license until four years after the
original application (art. 5(A)(4)); and could not order forfeiture until expiration of two years after
the grant of a compulsory license (art. 5(A)(3)). These two conditions exist to this day in the Pads
Convention, 1967, see Appendix, below.
28 See Convention Establishingthe World Intellectual Property Organization, 14 July 1967, 6
IL.M. 782.
29 Bodenhausen, supra note 26 at 209.
30

Doane, supra note 9 at 471.

31 H.P. Kunz-Hallstein, "The U.S. Proposal for a GA7T-Agreement on Intellectual Property
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property" in F.K. Beier & G. Schricker,
eds., GATT or wiPo? New Ways in the InternationalProtectionof Intellectual Property (Munich: Max
Planck Institute, 1989) 75 at 78.
32 D.E. de Kieffer, "U.S. Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters" in G.R.
Stewart, M.J. Tawlik & M. Irish, eds., InternationalTrade and Intellectual Property: The Search for a
Balanced System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994) 1.
33 R.C. Moy, "The History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-Interest As
An Influence" (1993) 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 457 at 488. Art. 2 of the Paris Convention, 1967
establishes that the principle of "national treatment" will govern national legislative initiatives
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Eventually, the United States prevailed, and intellectual property
was included in the Uruguay Round negotiations. India, one of the most
vocal developing countries in opposition, agreed in principle to the
inclusion of intellectual property in GATT and the director-general of
wiPo participating in the cATr negotiations.3 4

Despite this subdued agreement, the

TRIPS

and

NAFTA

texts

themselves reflect the struggle over which forum would be most
appropriate for multilateral negotiations regarding intellectual property.
Both agreements explicitly retain the law as it was set out in the Paris
Convention, 1967. TRIps article 2(1) "incorporates by reference" articles
1 through 12, and 19, of the Paris Convention, 1967, stating that the
agreement "shall comply" with those articles. Article 2(2) states that the
TRips agreement shall not "derogate from existing obligations that
members may have to each other under the Paris Convention ... ." Based
on the language of TRIPS article 2, I argue that well-established
interpretations of articles in the Paris Convention, 1967, should be used
to clarify any ambiguities that exist in TRiPS articles regarding similar
subject matter.
NAFTA article 2 is somewhat more ambiguous in its commitment to
respect the Paris Convention. Article 2 states: "each party shall, at a
minimum, give effect to this chapter and to the substantive provisions of
... the Paris Convention [1967]."3S It is possible to argue that any
protection extended to patentees in NAFTA complies with article 2 as long
as it does not involve the extension of less patent protection than was set
out in the Paris Convention. Consequently, any new, and stronger
protection provided for in NAFTA--even if it contravened the substantive
provisions of the Paris Convention, 1967-might comply with article 2.
At the very least, however, article 2 suggests that NAFTA should be
interpreted, if and where possible, in accordance with the Paris
Convention, 1967. Certainly, if NAFTA is silent, or ambiguous, with
respect to an issue that is clearly set out in the Paris Convention, the
Paris Convention should be used as a guide for interpreting NAFTA.
regarding intellectual property. National treatment stipulates that a country must treat foreign
patentees in the same manner as it treats its own patentees. A country can be in compliance with
this principle, even if it provides no patent protection whatsoever for foreign patentees, as long as it
does not grant patent protection to its own nationals. For example, several countries were
completely within the limits of the Paris Convention, 1967 when they excluded pharmaceutical
completely from their national patent legislation. Trips sets some substantive minimum protections
while at the same time adhering to the principle of national treatment. See, for example, the
twenty-year minimum patent protection-period (art. 33), and necessity of providing patent
protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products (art.70(8)).
34

Doane,supra note 9 at 473.

35

Ibid. [emphasis added].
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In the following section, therefore, I refer to the ParisConvention
to interpret TRIPS and NAFTA.
b) Parallelstructures
The drafting structures and substantive treatment of certain
subjects in TRIPS, and the Paris Conventions, 1883 through 1967, are
parallel. In this section, I propose to analyze the relationship of TRIPS
articles 27:1, 8, and 30 in light of the structurally and substantively
similar articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2) of the ParisConvention, 1967.
TRIPS, article 27:1 states that patents shall be available for
inventions whether they are imported or locally produced. 36
TRIPS, article 8(2), entitled "Principles," recognizes that measures
may need to be taken to "prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights and ... the resort to practices which ... affect the international

transfer of technology." 3 7 TRIPS, article 30, entitled "Exceptions to
Rights Conferred," provides that:
Members may provide limited exceptions for the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.3 8

It is unclear whether or not, or to what degree, articles 8 and 30 may

restrict the principle set out in article 27:1.39

36

Supra note 8.

37

The full text of art. 8, entitled, "Principles" states:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.
38 NAFA, art. 1709:6 uses the words "other persons" instead of "third parties." The position
that the two phrases are synonymous is apparently uncontroversial. See J.-G. Castel, Legal Opinion.
with Respect to Canada's Intellectual Property Obligations Regarding Pharmaceutical Patent
Compulsory Licensing Under the GeneralAgreement on Tariff and Trade (GAT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 23 March
1993) at 12 [unpublished].
39 It is also unclear what remedies might be available pursuant to arts. 30 and 8. This question
will be dealt with in Part III-Compulsory Licences, below.
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It is with the intention of clarifying this ambiguity that I propose
to turn to the Paris Convention, 1967. Articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2) of
the Paris Convention function in a very similar fashion to TRIPS articles
27:1, 8, and 30. Article 5(1) recognizes that importation alone is not a
sufficient ground to forfeit a patent. 4 0 This provision has the same
substantive content as article 27:1, which recognizes that patented
material can be imported.
Having recognized that patented material can be imported in
article 5(A)(1), article 5(A)(2) limits the practical implications of that
principle. Most importantly, for this section of the article, article 5(2)
states that parties may legislate remedial measures for "abuses ..., for
example, non-working." 41 Article 5(2) thereby provides elaboration by
what is meant by "abuses" in article 8 of TRIPS: non-local 42 working,
among other things.
I argue that the substantive provisions of article 5(A)(2) should be
"read into" the operation of articles 8 and 30 of TrIPS. There is certainly
nothing in TRIPS which either implicitly or explicitly precludes this
interpretive practice. I would argue, in fact, that this interpretation is
necessary given the harmonizing imperative of TRIPS article 2, discussed
above.
Based on the interpretation proposed above, it is fair to conclude
that, within the TRIPS framework, pursuant to articles 8 and/or 30, a
country could legislate local working provisions. The local aspect of the
working requirement would be limited, however, by the fact that some
importing of the patented subject matter would have to be allowed.
It is worth pointing out that the same conclusion would result
independently of which of the six versions of the Paris Convention one
relied upon. This observation serves to underscore the historical
continuity of this analysis.
In this section, I analyze the parallel frameworks that exist in
NAFTA, articles 1709:7, 1709:8 and 1709:943 and Paris Convention, 1967,
40

See Appendix, below.

41 Ibid.
42 Unlike NAFTA, art. 1709:6, TRIPS, arts. 30 and 8 include "abuse." Bodenhausen, supra note
26 at 70, states that "abuses that might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by

the patent" as stated in article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, 1967 relates, again, to failure to
work locally.
43 The text of NAFTA arts. 1709:6 to 1709:9 states:
6. A Party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,

provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent

owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of other persons.
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articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2).44 Like TRIPS, article 27:1, NAFTA, article
1709:6 recognizes that imports are patentable subject matter. NAFTA
article 1709:6 is almost identical 4s to TRIPS article 30 above, so I will not
repeat it here.
There are only two significant differences between the relevant
NAFTA

and TRIPS provisions. First, NAFTA, article 1709:8 provides that: "a

(b) the grant of a compulsory
party may revoke a patent only when ...
license has not remedied the lack of exploitation." Second, NAFTA does
not include an equivalent to TRIPS article 8. Consequently, the argument
in favour of importing the substantive provisions of article 5(A) of the
Paris Convention into NAFTA is little different from that set out in the

previous section regarding TRIPS.
In short, the argument is weakened by the absence in NAFTA of the
explicit mention of "abuses" and "practices which affect the
international transfer of technology," which were included in article 8 of
TRIPS. The argument is strengthened however, by the language of NAFTA
article 1709:8, which is extremely similar to Paris Convention, article
5(A)(2) which states that a state must only revoke (or forfeit) a patent
after having attempted to remedy abuses with compulsory licensing.
c) TRIPS "objectives".-preambleand article 7
Article 7 sets out the "Objectives" of TRIPS. It states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the

promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive
to social and economic welfare, and to a balanceof rights and obligations[emphasis added].

7. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the field of technology, the territory of the Party where the

invention was made and whether products are imported or locally produced.
8. A Party may revoke a patent only when:
(a) grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent; or
(b) the grant of a compulsory license has not remedied the lack of exploitation of the

patent.
9. Each Party shall permit patent owners to assign and transfer by succession their
patents, and to conclude licensing contracts.
44 See Appendix, below.
45 NAFTA, art. 1709:6 uses the words "other persons" instead of "third parties": see Castel,
supra note 38 at 12.
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I argue that article 7 reflects a far more subtle understanding of
the policy interests that patent law has to arbitrate than most strong
patents rights advocates are willing to recognize. Patent law has to
balance two sets of competing interests: the public interest in immediate
and widespread dissemination of technology; and the private interest of
individual creators, seeking maximum opportunity to exploit their
Patent rights advocates attempt to undercut this
inventions. 4 6
conceptual balance by arguing that there really is no competition
between public and private interests in patent law; that, in fact, the
strongest possible legal protection for their private interests will result in
the maximum public good. In short, they argue that stronger patent
protection creates greater incentive to innovate, which is in the public
interest.4 7 The emphasized segments of article 7, above, make it clear
that the objectives of the agreement go beyond this relatively simplistic
vision of strong patent rights.
First, the word "should" implies that the "protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights" does not necessarily
"contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer of technology." The agreement clearly envisages that something
other than the simple strengthening of patent laws may be necessary to
achieve its objectives (which include the transfer of technology).
Second, the article explicitly states that "protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to ... a
balance of rights and obligations." This language clearly indicates that
the objective of the agreement involves consideration of principles
beyond a mere strengthening of the patent holders rights. 48

46 Moy, supranote 33 at 483.
4 7 Ibid. at 480.
48 Additional support for the thesis that

TRIPs envisages

local working is found in art. 28, and

8(1). Article 27 is entitled "Patentable Subject Matter" and art. 28 is entitled "Rights Conferred."
It is logical to expect that the strongest statement in favour of the interpretation that importation
satisfies "working" would be set out in art. 28. Article 28, however, does not include the right to
import patented subject matter among its enumerated conferred rights. The article's sole reference
to importing has to do with the right of patent holders to prevent a third party from importing his or

her patented subject matter.
Article 8(1), entitled "Principles," allows members to amend laws to "to protect public health
and nutrition, and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic
and technical development." It is certainly arguable, with respect to art. 28(1), that a local working
requirement is an excellent way to foster the "public interest" in the "technical development" of any
variety of industries.
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3. Conclusion with respect to local working
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is evident that legislation
requiring local working of patents would not be in contravention of
either TRIPs or NAFTA. The argument is perhaps marginally stronger with
respect to Trps, given the inclusive reference to the ParisConvention in
TRIPS article 2. On the other hand, there is nothing in NAFTA, that either
directly, or implicitly, contradicts the Paris Convention. Consequently,
the significance of the weaker language with which NAFTA makes
reference to the Paris Convention is minimal.
Finally, it is important to note that the interpretation urged upon
us by patent rights advocates-that articles 27:1 and 1709:7 redefine
"working" to permit 100 per cent importing-effectively reverses the
historical function of patents. Patents were originally granted to
promote the domestic application of foreign technologies, with little
protection for the rights .of the original foreign patentees. The
interpretation advanced by patent advocates emphasizes protection of
foreign patentees, to the exclusion of any consideration of local interests
in technology transfers.
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING
A. Definition of Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing refers to the practice of governments to
compel the transfer, from a patent holder to a third party, of some or all
of the patent holder's right to produce a patented product, or use a
patented process. For the purposes of this article, I have divided the
conditions under which compulsory licences are granted into three
classes. Each class is defined by the existing situation for which the
license is granted as a remedy. Compulsory licences are granted in the
three following situations, as a remedy for 1) non-working; 2) other,
more broadly defined abuses; and 3) the public interest, without
consideration of whether or not there has been any abuse on the part of
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the patentee. 49
B. The Arguments in Favourof Severely Restricted Compulsory Licensing
One argument in favour of severely restricted compulsory
licensing is very closely connected to, and dependent upon, the meaning

of "working" in

TRIPS

and NAFTA. If one accepts that importation can, on

its own, satisfy "working,"50 then it follows that the practice of granting
mandatory licences as a remedy for non-working will be virtually
eliminated.
A second argument, concerning all three classes of compulsory
licences, is that any domestic legislation regarding compulsory licensing
must be in accordance with articles 3151 and 1709:10 of TRIPS and NAFTA,

49 One might construe the existence of a possible fourth class of compulsory licences, which
consists of compulsory licences granted to government, or public bodies, either as a remedy for nonworking, or for some other policy objective. Unlike the three classes of compulsory licences listed
above, which are defined by reference to the situations they are meant to rectify, this fourth class is
defined by the identity of the recipient of the licence, regardless of the remedial function of the
licence. That said, however, the fact that licences of this class would be awarded exclusively to
public bodies suggests that they are issued with public interest in mind (conversation with Prof. J.-G.
Castel, Osgoode Hall Law School, 10 February 1997).
50 That is the position I argued against in Part II, above.
51 Article 31, entitled "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder," states:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without
the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will
be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public
non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative
process to be anti-competitive;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
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respectively. If this position prevails, previous relatively broad
compulsory licensing powers would have to be constrained by the stricter
criteria set out in these articles.
Under TRIPS, article 31 and NAFTA, article 1709:10, grants of
compulsory licences would be limited to situations where, among other
things:52 the applicant previously attempted to secure a licence from the
patentee on reasonable commercial terms and conditions;53 the licence
is non-exclusive;5 4 the license is predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market;55 the licence terminates when the circumstances that
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill
which enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market
of the Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent
authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued
existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in
that Member,
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in
that Member,
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and
(f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive
practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such
cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of
authorization if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to
recur;
(1) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second
patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the first patent"),
[several] additional conditions shall apply.
52 NAFTA, art. 1709:10(1) is more narrow in scope than TRiPs, art. 31(1) inasmuch as the former
requires that licences granted to dependent patent owners must only be granted as "a remedy for an
adjudicated violation of domestic laws regarding anti-competitive practices."
53

55

NAFTA,

art. 1709:10(b) and TRIPS, art. 31(b).
art. 1709:10(d); and TRiPs, art. 31(d).

NAF'A,

art. 1709:10(f); and TRIPS, art. 31(0.

NAFTA,

54
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lead to its being granted in the first place cease to exist;5 6 and the
patentee is remunerated on the basis of economic value of the
authorization.S7
While countries may still be able to structure useful compulsory
licensing provisions in compliance with these articles, they are definitely
more restrictive than was previously allowed for under the Paris
Convention, 1967 article 5(A).S8
Consequently, if articles 31 and 1709:10 were the sole source of
compulsory licensing authority in TRIPSINAFTA, a problem would arise,

given that

TRIPS

and NAFTA are supposed to be consistent with the Paris

Convention, 1967, including article 5(A). This potential problem of
disagreement between the Paris Convention and TRIPS/NAFTA can be
avoided however, on the basis of the argument that a more generous
compulsory licensing scheme can also be grounded in article 30 of TRIPS

and article 1709:6 of NAFTA.
C. The Arguments in Favourof the Status Quo
1. Compulsory licensing should fall under TRIPS, article 30
and NAFTA, article 1709:6
Based on a "literal interpretation according to the ordinary
meaning of the words" in the respective NAFTA and TRIPS texts, it can be
argued that national legislation providing for compulsory licensing is
feasible under articles 30 and 1709:6.59 TRIPS, article 28 elaborates the
"Rights Conferred" on patent holders.60 Article 30 provides for

56 NTAFA, art. 1709:10(g); and

TRIPS, art. 31(g).

57TAFTA, art. 1709:10(h); and TRIPS, art. 31(h).
58 For example, arguably nothing in the ParisConvention prevents situations such as existed in
Canada prior to the 1987 PatentAct amendments, supra note 3, where compulsory licences were
granted independent of the patentees' ability to supply the local market, the licences were exclusive,
the rate of renumeration was set by legislative fiat, not by market value assessments, and there was
no provision for conditions subsequent to the grant of the licence for its having been rescinded.
59 Castel, supra note 38 at 12.
60 Art. 28, entitled "Rights Conferred," states:
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having
his consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for
these purposes that product [footnote omitted];
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"Exceptions to Rights Conferred." 61 It is clear based upon the ordinary
meaning of these words that limitations to article 28 patent rights would
be vested in article 30. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that compulsory
licences (if they are actually allowed within the framework of the
agreement), as limitations on patent rights, would fall within the
intended meaning of articles 30 and 1709:6.62
NAFTA, articles 1709:5 and 1709:6 are almost identical to TRIPS
articles 28 and 30, respectively. Consequently, the same argument would
apply that 1709:6 is the article under whose aegis compulsory licensing
was intended to fall.63
2. Interpreting TRIPS, article 30 and NAFTA, article 1709:6
It was established in the previous section that if compulsory
licenses were to be allowed within NAFTA and TRiPS, they would fall under
articles 30 and 1709:6. It still remains to be determined however, under
what circumstances those articles will actually allow compulsory
licensing. Unfortunately, articles 30 and 1709:6 are rife with ambiguous
phrases, the meanings of which are critical to this analysis.
Consequently, I have dedicated the following analysis to determining the
meaning of four crucial phrases found in articles 30 and 1709:6: 1)
"limited exceptions;" 2) "normal exploitation of a patent;" 3) "legitimate
interests of patent owners"(which I shall treat as synonymous with
"normal exploitation"); and 4) "legitimate interests of third parties." 64
TRIPS, article 8 provides a more complete picture of what may be
intended in article 30 by "legitimate interests of third parties." Article 8
sets out a number of considerations, or principles, that need to be taken
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having
his consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that
process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent
and to conclude licensing contracts.
61 Art. 30, "Exceptions to Rights Conferred" states "Members may provide limited exceptions
to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
62

Castel,supra note 38 at 12.

63 This position is weakened somewhat however, by the fact that the NAFTA articles are not
entitled "Rights Conferred," and "Exceptions to Rights Conferred," as the TRIPS articles are.
64 Supra note 43 and 61.
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into account when a country adopts intellectual property policy. These
considerations are not directly related to the patentee, but rather focus
on the overall domestic national interest as it may be affected by strong
patent protections. Article 8 specifies that states may take measures to
serve the following public interests: 1) protection of public health and
nutrition; 2) the promotion of public interest sectors of vital importance
to socio-economic and technological development; 3) protection against
unreasonably restrained trade; and 4) protection against practices that
adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 6 5 I argue that
these four public interest considerations should be included within the
meaning of "legitimate interests of third parties" set out in article 30 and
they must be taken into account when considering what patent right
exceptions can be created within the meaning of article 30.
Article 1709:8 of NAFTA, read together with article 1709:6, likewise
clarifies what the NAFTA drafters may have intended by "limited
exceptions" in article 1709:6. Article 1709:8 states that a "party may
revoke a patent only when ... the grant of a compulsory license has not

remedied the lack of exploitation." 66 Article 1709:8 juxtaposes the
remedies of compulsory licensing and forfeiture; it is clear from the
context that, of the two remedies, the drafters considered compulsory
licensing to represent the more limited exception to patent rights. I
argue, therefore, that compulsory licensing should be considered as one
of the "limited exceptions" to be considered in article 1709:6.
TRIPs, articles 30 and 31 provide some interpretive guidelines for
what the agreement's drafters may have intended by "limited
exceptions" in article 30. The title of article 31 of TRIPS is "Other Use
Without Authorization of the Right Holder." An interpretative footnote
to the title confirms that "other use" refers to article 30.67 There is no
comma between "use" and "without" in the title. If there were such a
comma, the implication would be that the article 31 "uses" were distinct
from article 30 "uses" because they involved situations without the
patentee's authorization. Since there is no such comma, however, the
only fair reading of the text requires the conclusion that article 30 also
involves "exceptions" without the patentee's authorization or consent.
Of course, one of the most obvious examples of such an unauthorized
exception is compulsory licensing.

65 Supra note 37.
66

Supra note 43[emphasis added].

67

Supra note 51.
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One might object that since articles 30 and 31 are clearly meant to
be mutually exclusive, they cannot both include compulsory licensing
within their intended meanings. I admit that the articles are mutually
exclusive; and I will argue in the following section that the classes of
compulsory licensing they deal with are mutually exclusive. 68
Having exhausted the interpretive resources within the TRIPS and
NAFTA agreements (i.e., other provisions within the respective treaties) to
discern the ambit of articles 30 and 1709:6, I will now rely on outside
sources, specifically the history of the Paris Convention. Ultimately, I
argue that whatever ambiguity remains with respect to the meaning of 1)
"normal exploitation," and patentees' "legitimate interests"; 2) "limited
exceptions"; and 3) interests of third parties is clarified by reading those
phrases in harmony with article 5 of the Paris Conventions, 1883 to 1967.
D. The First Compulsory Licences
The earliest known attempt to legislate compulsory licensing
came in the form of a bill (which was subsequently defeated) before the
United States Senate in 1790. The bill proposed that compulsory
licences be granted when patentees had failed to provide adequate
supply of the patented subject, or had charged too high a price.69 The
next documented attempt to introduce compulsory licensing arose in the
context of the 1873 Vienna Congress, which was one of the preliminary
negotiation rounds that culminated in the Paris Convention, 1883.
Although no binding legal instrument was produced by the Congress, the
parties resolved that compulsory licences should be made available
where the "public interest" required it. 70 This provision was adopted
into German law in 1877.71
Compulsory licensing was not, however, included in the Paris
Convention, 1883. In fact, it was not until the 1925 Revision Conference
of the Hague that there is any mention of compulsory licensing in the
Paris Convention. Pursuant to the amended article 5 of the Hague
Revisions, member countries were authorized to take necessary
legislative measures to "prevent the abuses which might result from the
68 In anticipation of the argument below, I shall provide the conclusion here: class 1 and 2
compulsory licences fall within the meaning of art. 30; class 3 compulsory licences probably fall
within the meaning of art. 31, supranote 51.
69 Penrose, supra note 24 at 165-66.
70

Ibid at 47.

71 Ibid at 166.
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exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work."72
Such legislation could not invoke forfeiture, however, "unless the grant
of compulsory licenses [was] insufficient to prevent such abuses." 73
1.... as a remedy for non-working (class 1)
Prior to 1925, the only remedy available for non-working,
pursuant to the Paris Conventions, 1883, 1900, and 1911 was forfeiture. 74
Article 5(3) of the Hague Revision, 1925 of the Paris Convention,
substituted compulsory licensing for forfeiture as a remedy for patentee
abuses (including non-working). Forfeiture was still an available
remedy, but only after attempts through compulsory licensing had
failed.
The introduction of mandatory licensing was not achieved without
controversy. Mandatory licensing represented a compromise 75 between
the most industrialized countries, led by the United States, who were
pushing for the complete eradication of "working," and less
industrialized countries (the most vocal being Japan, Yugoslavia, and
Poland) who preferred the status quo. One of the primary fears of the
latter group was that the right to grant compulsory licences to domestic
licensees would be useless because the potential local licences lacked
sufficient technical capability to "take on" the patented production or
application in the first place. 76
2.... as a remedy for other "abuses" (class 2)
While the less developed countries' resistance to the introduction
of compulsory licensing was defeated, they were not entirely
disappointed with the outcome of the 1925 Hague Revision Conference.
While they lost direct access to their most forceful remedy for
non-working (forfeiture), the Convention did extend the application of

72

ParisConvention, 1925, art. 5(2). See Appendix, below.

73

Ibid. art. 5(3).

74

See Appendix, below and the discussion of local working, above.

75 S. Patel, "Can the Intellectual Property System Serve the Interests of Indigenous
Knowledge?" in S.B. Brush & D. Stabinsky, eds., Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and

IntellectualPropertyRights (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996) 305 at 312.
76 Anderfelt, supranote 15 at 80 and 89.
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the new remedy (compulsory licensing) to a broader range of actionable
"abuses." 77
"Abuse" has been widely interpreted across a number of judicial
jurisdictions, including situations where patents were being worked, but
not sufficiently to satisfy local demand, or at exorbitant prices.78 The
British Patents and DesignsAct, 1949 for example, allowed for the grant
of compulsory licenses when demand for a patented article was not
being met on reasonable terms, or when the demand was being met "to a
substantial extent by importation," or when the commercial working of a
patent was hindered by the importation of the article.79
3.... in the public interest (class 3)
Many countries have also developed laws whereby they may grant
compulsory licences-despite there being no evidence of abuse by the
patentee-if they consider it is in the public interest to do so. In
Germany, for example, in the early and middle part of this century,
compulsory licences were granted to reduce the cost of vital goods,
ensure adequate supply to the domestic market, prevent plant failures,
and to improve the balance of trade by encouraging domestic, export
industries. 8 0 Until 1991, Canadian patent legislation allowed for
compulsory licences for pharmaceuticals in the absence of proof of
abuse by the original patentee.8 1 Between 1987 and 1991 the Canadian
Patent Act provided for a longer grace period during which time
patentees were free from the threat of compulsory licenses if the
patented pharmaceuticals contained active compounds manufactured in
Canada. This extra protection was afforded by way of incentive to
further public policy goals and was independent of any other criterion
for judging patentee behaviour. 82
Georg Bodenhausen confirms that the use of compulsory
licensing to advance the public policy interests beyond simply ensuring

77
78
79

See art 5(3), HagueRevisions in Appendix, below.
Penrose, supra note 24 at 171.
Ibid. at 181.

80

Ibid.at 183.
81 PatentAct, S.C. 1923, c. 69; PatentAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203, as am. byAn Act to amend the
PatentAct, S.C. 1968-69, c.55; and the Patent Act, Trade Marks Act and Food and Drugs Act
Amendment, S.C. 1968-69, c. 49.
82 See PatentAct amendments, supranote 3.
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working falls legitimately within the framework of article 5 of the Paris
Convention, 1967:
The provisions in paragraph (2) ... do not deal with measuresother than those whose purpose
is to prevent the abuses referred to. The member States are therefore free to provide
analogous or different measures, for example, compulsory licenses on conditions other
than those indicated in paragraph (4) in other cases where the public interest is deemed to
require such measures. This may be the case when patents concern vital interests of the
country in the fields of military security or public health or in the case of so-called

"dependant patents' etc.83

Since 1925, through three Revision Conferences (1934, 1958, and
1967) compulsory licensing has been specifically designated in the Paris
Conventions as the primary remedy for abuses, including non-local
working. It has also been used by a variety of countries, without
regulated uniformity, to promote the "public interest" even in cases
where there has not been abuse.
4. The relationship of the Paris Convention to TRIPS and NAFTA
An analysis of the relationship of the Paris Convention, 1967, to
TRIPS

and

NAFTA,

has already been rehearsed in Part II(C)(2), above. I

will emphasize here, however, that article 5 of the Convention pertains to

the same subject matter as articles 30 and 1709:6 of

TRIPS

and

NAFTA,

respectively. All three articles deal with exceptions to patent rights
which are provided for in other articles, or subsections. I argue that this
similarity, coupled with the references to the Paris Convention in both

the

NAFTA

and the

TRIPS

articles above, provides an adequate basis upon

which to proceed with the analysis.
I argue that, in light of the historical development of compulsory
licensing set out above, the only reasonable conclusion is that the use of
compulsory licenses as a remedy for 1) non-local working, and 2)
"abuses," constitutes "normal" limits on patentee rights. Since the 1925
Hague Revision Conference, compulsory licences have been available
both for non-working, and for other, broader based, "abuses." It would
be unfair to conclude, on the basis of such evidence, that compulsory
licences for these two uses constituted an unreasonable prejudice to the
legitimate interests of the patent owner.
It follows, therefore, that compulsory licensing for 1) nonworking, and, 2) other patentee abuses, fall within the meaning of
articles 30 and 1709:6.
83 Bodenhausen, supra note 26 at 70 [emphasis added].

270

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 35 No. 2

It is not so clear, however, that the grant of compulsory licences in
the public interest, where no abuse has been established (class 3), is an
equally well-established practice, or that it has enjoyed equal support
among the Paris Convention members. The evidence is equivocal. As
Bodenhausen stated in the passage cited above, 84 countries were free to
grant mandatory licences in the public interest (without proof of abuse)
pursuant to the Paris Convention, because the Convention was silent on
the issue. The record of countries granting such licences is uneven.
Consequently, I cannot argue with equal assurance that the third class of
compulsory licences is normal, and that it does not "unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties." I am not able to conclude,
therefore, whether or not compulsory licensing in the public interest
without proof of abuse falls within the intended meaning of articles 30
and 1709:6.
In the alternative, if mandatory licensing in the name of the public
interest (absent proof of abuse) is not intended to fall within the
meaning of articles 30 and 1709:6, it would fall within the meaning of
articles 31 and 1709:10.
In this context, once again, TRIPS provides a better set of
interpretive tools than does NAFTA. As noted above, TRIPS article 31
(unlike article 1709:10) has a title and an interpretive footnote. The title
is "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder" and the
footnote confirms that articles 30 and 31 are mutually exclusive.8 5 I
argue that mandatory licensing in the public interest without proof of
abuse is an "other use without authorization of the right holder"
exclusive of the first two classes of compulsory licences I have identified.
While it would be interesting to enter into an analysis regarding
the limits of the substantive provisions that could be crafted pursuant to
articles 31 and 1709:10, it is not within the scope of this paper to do so.
It can be said with confidence that articles 31 and 1709:10 would
substantially curtail the freedom many states have enjoyed in granting
compulsory licences.8 6 Unfortunately, a detailed examination of
whether a state's "public interest" can be effectively advanced in
accordance with these articles will have to be set aside for later research.

84

Ibid

85

Supra note 51.

86 See Part III(B), above and accompanying footnotes.
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5. Conclusion regarding compulsory licensing
On the basis of the above analysis, it is reasonable to conclude

that

NAFTA

and

TRIPS

allow compulsory licensing as a remedy for

non-local working and other, more broadly defined abuses (such as
insufficient working, and inadequate supply of local market).
Compulsory licensing in these instances would fall within the meaning of
TRiPS, article 30 and NAFTA, article 1709:6.87 Neither of these two
provisions sets out concrete guidelines with respect to the conditions
under which such licenses could be granted. Consequently, national
legislation passed with respect to these two classes of compulsory
licences could be relatively broad.
It is not so clear however, whether compulsory licensing in the
public interest, without proof of abuse, would similarly fall within the
meaning of the same articles. It is more likely that this third class of
compulsory licensing would fall within the aegis of TrIps article 31 and
NAFTA article 1709:10. Consequently, compulsory licensing in the public
interest, in the absence of proof of patentee abuse, would be subject to
the limitations set out in that article. 88
IV. HOW IS BIODIVERSITY RELEVANT TO PATENTS?
A. A Short Introductionto the CBD
It might not be immediately obvious how a convention that is
(judging by its title) concerned with environmental protection impacts
upon the international regulation of patent law.8 9 Therefore, I will
provide a brief summary of how these two seemingly distinct areas of law
have come to intersect.

87

Supra note 61 and 43 respectively.

88 The conclusion might be different if one were to accept the notion, as suggested in note 49,
supra, that there is a fourth distinct class of compulsory licences-those which are granted to

government. In this case, one could argue that this fourth class of compulsory licence is sufficiently
distinct from the other three classes to come under the aegis of arts. 31 and 1709:10 alone.

According to this reasoning, one could add compulsory licences, without proof of abuse, granted to
private sector third parties into the list of classes falling under arts. 30 and 1709:6. This would have
the practical effect of allowing governments broader potential field of justifications and conditions
under which they could grant compulsory licences.
89 See P. Gormely, "Compulsory Patent Licences and Environmental Protection" (1993) 7
Tul. Env.'l L.J. 131 at 132, describing patents as "environmentally neutral."

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 35 No. 2

Plant breeders, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 9 0 and the
biotechnical industries generally rely upon the biological diversity of
southern developing countries for inputs into their commercial activities.
For example, plant breeders cull disease resistant genes from traditional
plant varieties still being used by subsistence farmers in developing
countries to introduce desired qualities into elite commerical plant
varieties. Pharmaceuticals are often developed from the active
compounds of plants located in developing countries with high levels of
biological diversity. Approximately 90 per cent of the genetic resources
used in agricultural production originate in the third world. 9 1 It is
estimated that 50 per cent of all prescriptions filled in the United States
are derived from naturally occurring compounds 92 In Europe, Japan,
and North America, the sales of pharmaceuticals derived from plants in
1989 totalled 43 billion dollars. 93
Yet, in spite of the increased commercial value of biodiversity as a
whole, the world stock of biodiversity is diminishing. It is estimated that
there are currently between 10 to 30 million species in the world, out of
which approximately 1.4 million have been identified.94 Tropical forests
house somewhere between 50 and 90 per cent of this total. 9 5 Yet
ralnforests are being destroyed at a rate of approximately 142,000 square
kilometres per year. 96 Approximately 27,000 species are extinguished

90 Agro-corporations are the most reliant upon biodiversity for the discovery and development
of new products. The pharmaceutical industry ranks second: see S. Kadidal, "Plants, Poverty, and
Pharmaceutical Patents" (1993) 103 Yale L.J. 223 at 227.
91 BiotechnologyNewswatch, 16 October 1992 cited in Gormely, supra note 89 at 152, note 100.
92 Kadidal, supra note 90 at 224.
93 W.V. Reid, et aL, "A New Lease on Life" in Biodiversity Prospecting (Washington, D.C.:
World Resources Institute, 1993) 1 at 12.
94 E.L. Highes, "Forests, Forestry Practices and the Living Environment" in S.P. Johnson, ed.,
GlobalForestsand InternationalEnvironmentLaw (The Hague: Kluwar Law International, 1996) 79
at 107.
95 World Resources Institute, Global Biodiversity Strategy: Guidelinesfor Action to Save Study,

and Use the Earth's Biotic Wealth Sustainably and Equitably (Washington D.C: World Resources
Institute, 1992) at 7.
96 Ibid D. VanderZwaag & D. MacKinlay, "Towards a Global Forests Convention: Getting
Out of the Woodsand Barking up the Right Tree" in S.P. Johnson, ed., Global Forests and
EnvironmentalLaw (London: Kluwar Law International, 1996) 1 at 9, cite that the "annual tropical
deforestation rate in 1980 was estimated at 11.3 million ha or 0.58 percent/year compared to the
1990 estimate of 17 million ha or approximately 1 percent."
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97
each year, and the rate of extinction is growing exponentially.
Agricultural or crop diversity is also being diminished at alarming rates.
Leading commentators on the subject generally agree that the primary
cause of the agricultural bio-genetic erosion is the replacement of

genetically heterogenous, traditional crops with elite, genetically uniform

plant varieties bred for high yielding commercial agriculture. 98
Obviously, international law and market forces have failed to
provide adequate incentives, or punitive measures, in order to protect
against the further depletion of biodiversity. 9 9 Instead, most current
incentives, particularly in the developing world in the areas of highest
biological diversity, encourage "short term exploitation of resources."1 00
Local communities and national governments controlling areas of high
biological diversity are driven to their destruction by short term
investment incentives, such as mining, timber, and ranching-all
01
activities that tend toward the eradication of biological diversity.1
Similarly, there are currently insufficient incentives for farmers using

97 K.E.Moore, "Inclusion of Biodiversity Protection Within a Forest Treaty" in S.P. Johnson,
ed., Global Forests and InternationalEnvironment Law (The Hague: Kluwar Law International,
1996) 126 at 128.
98 J. Holden, J. Peacock, & T. Williams, Genes, Crops and the Environment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 29-32 and at 11, where the author establishes direct
correlation between breeding effectiveness and rates of biogenetic loss, "the rate of loss [of crop
biological diversity] accelerated with the increasing effectiveness of breeding." See also, M.L.
Olfield & J.B. Alcom, "Conversation of Traditional Agroecosystems" in M.L. Olfield & J.B. Alcom,
eds., Biodiversity: Culture, Conservationand Ecodevelopment (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993)
at 39 where the authors argue that "the principle cause of genetic erosion has been the widespread
adoption of modem crop cultivators within areas of ancient agriculture." See C. Fowler & P.
Mooney, Shattering:Food, Politics& the Loss of Genetic Diversity (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1990) at 75, where the authors state the replacement is ten times more likely to be the cause
of crop variety extinction than any other cause. See also M.L. Oldfield, The Value of Conserving
Genetic Resources (Sunderland, Mass: Sinauer Assoc., 1989) at 14.
99 Art. 2 of the cBD, supra note 5, defines "biological diversity" as "the variability among living
organisms from all sources, including, interalia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems
and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between
species and of ecosystems."
100 Gormely, supranote 89 at 137 and 154-55.
101 "[The] [c]onventional approach to trade is also inherently unsustainable in that it depends
on constantly expanding extraction of resources and consumption and production of goods, which
brings it up against fixed ecological constraints": see D.R. Downes, "Global Trade, Local
Economies, and the Biodiversity Convention" in W. Snape, ed., Biodiversity and the Law
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996) 202 at 208-09. See also V. Shiva, Monocultures of Min&
Perspectiveson Biodiversity and Biotechnology (London: Zed Books, 1993), regarding the pernicious
effects of export-oriented crop restructuring programs on biodiversity, that is, the replacement of a
variety of crops and locally valuable "weeds" by a single crop with extraordinarily narrow genetic
variability.
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biologically diverse traditional crops to maintain this practice, when
commercial incentives tend~to push in the direction of crop replacement
with commercial mono-crops.
The CBD seeks to create a new form of partnership between the
developed and developing countries, wherein the developing country will
receive incentives from the developed world to preserve genetic
resources 02 for the benefit of all. The CBD represents a novel attempt to
address both environmental and trade issues in the same document.
. It is not surprising, perhaps, that a project of such global
proportions has been besieged by interest groups whose agendas are
incommensurable. As discussed in the subsequent analysis of the cBD,
the negotiating parties never did reach a compromise position on issues
that would have been necessary for the Convention to be internally
coherent. Consequently, the CBD's provisions are often contradictory,
undermining in one paragraph a right or obligation that has been
created in another.
Interpretations of the overall effect of the CBD are numerous and
widely divergent. At one end of the spectrum is the notion that the cBD
recognizes new intellectual property rights in raw, genetic resources in
developing countries.1 03 At the opposite end, some commentators claim
that the sole achievement of the CBD was to advance the cause of
biotechnical industries by going beyond TRIPS in recognizing the
patentability of advanced life forms (which TRiPS article 27:2 leaves open
to individual state's discretion).
B. Highlights of the Biodiversity Convention Relevant to
Local Working and Compulsory Licensing
1. Objectives
Article 1 states that the CBD'S objectives are: 1) the conservation,
and sustainable use of biological diversity; and 2) "the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."

The "fair sharing" is to be achieved by a) providing appropriate access
to genetic resources, and b) providing "appropriatetransfer of relevant

102 The CBD, supra note 5, art. 2, defines "genetic resources" as "genetic material of actual or
potential value." "Genetic material," in turn, is defined as "any material of plant, animal, microbial
or other origin containing functional units of heredity."
103 Kadidal, supra note 90 at 228.
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technologies."104 While article I does not explicitly state whom these
objectives are meant to affect, it is obvious from the overall structure of

the agreement that it is the developing countries who are meant to
"provide access," and the developed countries who are meant to

"provide technology."

2. Access to genetic resources

Perhaps the most significant and' least controversial achievement
in the CBD is the conceptual shift in control over genetic resources which

is set out in article 15.105 Historically, "genetic resources" have been

thought of as part of the "common heritage of humankind,"106 belonging
to no one, and free for use by all. Consequently, drug companies, plant
breeders, and biotechnology industries have drawn on the genetic
104 [Emphasis added].
105 Art. 15, entitled "Access to Genetic Resources" states:
1. Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to
determine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject
to national legislation.
2. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to
genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to
impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this Convention.
3. For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a
Contracting Party, as referred to in this Article and Articles 16 and 19, are only those that
are provided by Contracting Parties that are countries of origin of such resources or by
the Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with this Convention.
4. Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the provisions
of this Article.
5. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the
Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party.
6. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scientific research
based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with the full
participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.
7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as
appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the
financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair
and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from
the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party
10 6
Kadidal,supra note 90 at 228.
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resources of developing countries without providing any form of
remuneration. Article 15 fundamentally alters the relationship of the
rest of the world to the genetic resources within a specific country. By
recognizing that national governments alone have "authority to
determine acress to genetic resources," article 15 shifts genetic resources
out of the so-called "common heritage of humankind," and makes them
subject to state control.1 07
This control is qualified (at least notionally) by subsequent
paragraphs of article 15 which require that states "create conditions to
facilitate access to genetic resources ... and not to impose restrictions
that run counter to the incentives of [the] Convention." In the final
result, however, article 15 represents a significant shift in control over
genetic resources in favour of individual states.
3. Transfer of technology
Certainly the provisions dealing most directly with the subject of
technology transfers are found in article 16.108 They are also the most
10 7

See M. Powers, "The United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity: Will
Biodiversity Preservation be Enhanced Through its Provisions Concerning Biotechnology
Intellectual Property Rights?" (1993) 12 Wis. Int'l L.J.103 at 111; and Kadidal, supra note 90 at 321,
to the effect that "establishing sovereign rights over natural resources is the opposite of treating
them as the 'common heritage of humanity."'
108
Art. 16, entitled,"Access to and Transfer of Technology," states:
1. Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes biotechnology, and that
both access to and transfer of technology among Contracting Parties are essential
elements for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention, undertakes subject to
the provisions of this Article to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other
Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity or make-use of genetic resources and do not cause significant
damage to the environment.
2. Access to and transfer of technology referred to in paragraph 1 above to developing
countries shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms,
including on concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed, and, where
necessary, in accordance with the financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21.
In the case of technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights, such
access and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with
the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. The application of
this paragraph shall be consistent with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below.
3. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as
appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in particular those that are developing
countries, which provide genetic resources are provided access to and transfer of
technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, including
technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights, where necessary,
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controversial. On one hand, the drafters begin each paragraph with bold
statements about the obligations of developed countries to transfer
technology. The forcefulness of these statements, however, is repeatedly
undercut by the insertion of mollifying phrases such as "on mutually
agreed upon terms,"1 0 9 and "consistent with the protection of
intellectual property rights."
For example, article 16, paragraph 1, states that, "access to and
transfer of technology ...
are essential elements to the attainment of the
objectives of this Convention," and that contracting parties undertake to
facilitate the transfer of "technologies that are relevant to the
conservation of biodiversity" and those that "make use of genetic
resources". Interpreted on its own, it would be reasonable to conclude
that this provision supported the inclusion of working requirements and
compulsory licensing in national legislation. The strength of this
paragraph, however, is undermined by paragraph 2 which states that
access and transfer of technology in paragraph 1 shall be on "mutually
agreed terms," and that patented technologies shall be treated
"consistent with [the] protection of intellectual property rights."
In a similar vein, article 16, paragraph 3, requires that states shall
pass legislation to ensure adequate transfer of technology to developing
countries, but goes on to state that such legislation would have to make
allowance for "mutually agreed upon terms."
In paragraph 4, the CBD states that each party shall pass legislation
to ensure that the private sector "facilitates" the transfer of technology.
On one hand, this provision seems likely to include compulsory
licensing, or mandatory licensing within its meaning. On the other hand,
it has been observed that, if this section were really meant to promote
through the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 and in accordance with international law and
consistent with paragraphs 4 and 5 below.
4. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as
appropriate, with the aim that the private sector facilitates access to, joint development
and transfer of technology referred to in paragraph 1 above for the benefit of both
governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries and in this
regard shall abide by the obligations included in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.
5. The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property rights
may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this
regard subject to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such

rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives.
109 See M. Urbanski, "Chemical Prospecting, Biodiversity Conservation, and the Importance
of International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Biological Materials" (1995) 2 Buff. J.
Int'l L. 131 at 169, where he states, "The effect of article 16 seems to send a message that parties
should favor developing nations in the transfer of technology, but that they are not obligated in
anyway to do so."
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compulsory licensing, the drafters would have replaced the word
"facilitates" with "compels."11 0 Once again, the ultimate meaning of the
paragraph is made even more ambiguous by the additional proviso that
it has to be read consistently with the previous paragraphs, wherein the
continued protection for intellectual property rights is recognised.
In each case, the provisions double back upon themselves,
ultimately shunting the responsibility for clarifying the state of
international law on the subject to sources outside of the CBD.H11
It is possible however, that this circular tendency of the CBD to
"outsource" lawmaking responsibility is broken by article 16, paragraph
5. This provision states that parties shall ensure that intellectual
property rights are supportive of, and do not run counter to, the
objectives of the Convention. This paragraph does not have to be read
consistently with any others. Yet paragraph 2, discussed above, which
recognizes the preservation of intellectual property rights, has to be read
consistently with paragraph 5. Arguably, therefore, paragraph 5
overrides paragraph 2, and therefore the CBD recognizes the
paramountcy of the need to transfer technology over patent protection.
If this interpretation should prevail, 112 there would be strong grounds for

110 C.J. Tinkler, "Introduction to Biological Diversity: Law, Institutions, and Science" (1994)
1 Buff. J. Int'l L. 1 at 18. It would certainly be possible to argue, as in Parts II and III, above, that
the history of patent law supports the notion that adequate and effective protection does not
exclude compulsory licensing and working requirements. At the time of drafting the Convention,
many countries did not extend patent protection to pharmaceuticals, and compulsory licences were
widely available as a result of local non-working. Of course, in Canada at that time, we still had
compulsory licensing without need of proof of lack of working. Only the United States did not have
any working requirement, and attendant compulsory licence. It could be argued, in exactly the same
manner as I argued with respect to art. 30 of TRIPS, that historical analysis reveals that mandatory
licensing and working requirements are "normal" limits on the adequate and effective protection of
patent rights.

111 K. Bosselmann, "Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity" (1995) 7 Colo. J. Int'l Env'tl. L. & Pol'y 111 at 139.
112 Articles 19(2) and 20 of the CBD provide further equivocal support for local working and
compulsory licensing. Article 19(2) stipulates that the parties "shall take all practicable measures to
promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties, especially

developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic
resources provided by those contracting Parties." But it then adds, "Such access shall be on

mutually agreed terms."
Article 20 is somewhat stronger, pledging developed countries to fund developing countries'
compliance with the Convention. Para. 4 is explicit that developing countries' compliance with the

Convention is contingent upon "the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their
commitments under this convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology ......
Paragraph 5 states that the "parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situation
of least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology."
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concluding that the CBD authorizes domestic legislation in developing
countries with high levels of biological diversity requiring local working
and compulsory licences, 113 potentially in all three classes of mandatory
licences.
4. Alternative legal outcomes of the CBD
The legal effect of article 16 is uncertain. It may or may not
provide support for the notion that developing nations can, or should,
require local working and compulsory licensing. Consequently, most
commentators appear to have settled on the notion that the most
plausible effect of the CBD arises out of the article 15 recognition that
nations have control over their genetic resources. This recognition
provides a legal platform from which developing nations can pass
national "bio-access" legislation and negotiate contracts with foreign
governments, or corporations, for access to their biodiversity. Such
contractual agreements could include provisions for technology
transfers, royalties, land rents, bio-prospecting feesll4-whatever the
115
market will bear.
C. The CBD's Relation to The Paris Convention, TRIPS, andNAFTA
Article 22 of the CBD states that the Convention does not affect the
rights and obligations of other international agreements except to the
extent that they would "cause a serious damage or threat to biological
diversity." 116 The question of whether intellectual property rights
113 M. Chandler, "The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the
International Lawyer" (1993) 4 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 141 at 155, 165; and D. Bell, "The
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: The Continuing Significance of United States Objections
at the Earth Summit" (1993) 26 Geo. Wash. J Int'l L. & Econ. 480 at 522-23.
114 C. Horton, "Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Under Intellectual Property
Law Toward a New International System" (1995) 10 J. Envtl. L. Spc. & Litig. 1 at 36.
115 Bell, supranote 113 at 533.
116 Art. 22 of the CmD, entitled "Relationship with Other International Conventions," states:

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the

exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to
biological diversity.

2. Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to the marine
environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law of the
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constitute a threat to biological diversity is a matter of considerable
controversy, 11 7 and beyond the scope of this article. As far as I am
concerned, however, these analyses tend to focus on TRIPS, and the
InternationalConvention for the Protection of New Varieties of PlantslS
(uPov), versions 1978 and 1991, to the exclusion of the ParisConvention.
This exclusion is probably due to the fact that the Paris Convention does
not impose minimum standards of protection, and does not create
obligations to protect particularly sensitive and specific subject matters,
such as plant varieties.1 19
Since there are no apparent reasons for believing that the Paris
Convention may cause a serious threat to biodiversity, it is fair to
conclude that the CBD does not affect the rights and obligations arising
out of the ParisConvention.
Article 22 does not, however, govern the CBD's relationship to
TRIPS because TRIPS did not exist when the CBD came into force in
December 1993. TRIPS, furthermore, makes absolutely no mention of the
cBD. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties12Ofor guidance in interpreting the relationship of the two
agreements. Article 30, paragraph 2, df the Vienna Convention states
that, with respect to agreements dealing with the "same subject matter":
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties to the later treaty but the earlier treaty
is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only
to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.

Clearly then, based on the Vienna Convention, TRIPS would prevail over
the CBD, and parties to both agreements would be obliged to comply with
TRIPS where the two agreements applied equally to any given legal
initiative.
sea.
117 For arguments that there is a causal connection between intellectual property law and the
erosion of plant genetic diversity, see G.S. Nijar, Tmtps andBiodiversity: The Threat andResponses: A
Third World View (Penang: Third World Network, 1996) and R. Vellv6, Saving the Seed: Genetic
Diversity and European Agriculture (London: Earthscan Publications, 1992). For excellent
background information on the topic, see Fowler & Mooney, supra note 98; K Bosselmann, "Plants
and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity" 7 Colo.
J.Int'l L. & Pol'y 111; and Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), "Utility Plant
Patents: A Review of the U.S. Experience (1985-July 1995)" RAFi Communique, July/August 1995.
118 815 U.N.T.S. 89 as revised at Geneva on 10 November 1972; on 23 October 1978 and on
19 March 1991, see upov Doc. No. DC/91/138,19 March 1991.
119 TRips,supra note 1, art. 27(2)(b).
120 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesbetween States and InternationalOrganizations,20
March 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, reproduced from UN GAOR A/CONF.129/15 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
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The prevalence of TRIPS and NAFTA over the CBD could be checked,
however, in instances where one argued successfully that, in fact, the
agreements were not concerned with the "same subject matter," in the
words of the Vienna Convention. In keeping with this line of argument,
it has been suggested, that because the CBD'S consideration of intellectual
property rights is circumscribed by their relation to biodiversity
conservation, the CBD and TRIPS are not dealing with the same subject
matter. 121 I do not intend to argue the point in this paper. It is
sufficient to note that this is the point upon which one would determine
whether TRIPS would override the CBD, or the CBD would enjoy a separate
sphere of legal influence.
If TRIPS and NAFTA do, in fact, deal with the same subject matter,
their provisions would overrule the cBD's provisions. Consequently, even
if the CBD did support domestic legislation requiring mandatory working
and broad-based compulsory licensing, that support would be useless if
that same legislation were found to be in contravention of TRIPS or NAFTA.
D. One Last Chance: TRIPS Preamble
While neither TRIPS nor NAFTA makes reference to the CBD, TRIPS
does contain one passage which recognizes the special situation of
developing countries. The TRIPS preamble includes the following
statement: "Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed
country members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base ...

."

This passage reflects

the same concern as is expressed in article 16(5) of the CBD, that it may
be necessary to reconsider rules that adversely affect the transfer of
technology to developing countries. It is not, however, a sentiment
which the drafters of TRIPS thought important enough to place in its own
proper article. Certainly, this passage alone is not sufficient grounds to
argue that the TRIPS should be read consistently with the CBD.

121 C. MacDougal & R. Hall, IntellectualPropertyRights and the Biodiversity Convention: The
Impact of GAIT, preparedfor the Friends of the Earth (England, Scotland and N. Ireland) International

Trade, Environment and Sustainability Campaign, 1996 citing the Centre for International
Environmental Law, The Biodiversity Convention and the TRIPS Agreement: The relationshipof the
Two Agreements in InternationalLaw, draft, 25 February 1994 [unpublished].

282

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 35 No. 2

E. Conclusion Regardingthe CBD
Despite the strong rhetorical commitments in some of the
passages of the CBD to the enforcement of international technology
transfers, the most likely conclusion is that the CBD does little to advance
the cause of mandatory local working and compulsory licensing. The
provisions within the agreement are, for the most part, self-defeating. In
addition, the subsequent passage of NAFTA and TRipS, without any
provision for the recognition of the CBD, detracts substantially from the
possibility of the CBD affecting international law regarding technology
transfers in ways fundamentally different from what will be developed
under TRIPS and NAFTA.
V. CONCLUSION
Based primarily on the arguments set out above, I can make four
conclusions. First, I conclude that a state could still invoke local working
requirements, as long as they were invoked after the three-year grace
period prescribed in article 5 of the Paris Convention, 1967. Second,
drawing from the arguments set out in Part III, above, I conclude that
states still have a relatively broad discretion to grant compulsory licences
as remedies for 1) non-local working, and 2) abuses such as insufficient
working and exorbitant pricing. I further conclude that "the jury is still
out" with respect to mandatory licensing in the public interest where
there is no allegation of patentee abuse. The evidence appears to favour
the conclusion that this particular compulsory licensing practice should
fall within the meaning of article 31 of TRIPS and article 1709:10 of NAFTA.
Consequently, compulsory licensing in the public interest could be
circumscribed in accordance with the strictures of those articles. 122
Third, despite the grandiose phraseology of passages of the CBD,
the agreement is of little practical use for countries who might seek to
rely upon it as international legal support for the introduction of
working requirements and broadly based compulsory licensing.
122 Again, it must be pointed out that another plausible conclusion exists based on the logic of
my argument; that a fourth category of compulsory licences exists (i.e., licences granted to
government), and this category is sufficiently distinct from the prior three categories so that it would
fall exclusively within the ambit of arts. 31 and 1709:10, therefore leaving the other three classes
within the ambit of arts. 30 and 1709:6. This would have the practical effect of allowing countries
relatively wide discretion to legislate compulsory licensing in furtherance of public policy goals, even
in situations where there was no proof of abuse on the part of the patentee, as long as the licensee is
in the private sector. See supra note 49.
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Fortunately, such reliance is largely unnecessary, given the relative
flexibility of TRIPS and NAFTA with respect to compulsory licensing and
local working requirements.
Finally, based on the prior three conclusions, it is reasonable to
conclude that countries which have recently surrendered relatively
broad-based powers for granting compulsory licenses and for compelling
local working have exceeded their obligations pursuant to both TRIPS and
NAFTA.

From a practical standpoint, it may seem like a moot point that
countries are allowed to invoke local working pursuant to TRIPS and
NAETA. Several countries have already long since voluntarily surrendered
whatever legislation they had that required local working, 123 or at least
stopped enforcing the requirement. One should not forget however,
that part of the reason why these countries loosened their local working
requirements in the first place was the ready availability of compulsory
licences as introduced in the Hague Revisions of the Paris Convention,
1925.124 The argument in this article regarding local work requirements
will take on added significance if, contrary to the conclusion I urge in
Part II, all compulsory licensing is determined to fall within articles 31
and 1709:10 of TRIPS and NAFTA respectively. If this should come to pass,
the local working requirement would once again represent the best and
most practical means by which a country could compel technology
transfers. As the brief historical review in this article revealed, patentees
prefer the possibility of being made the subject of the grant of a
compulsory licence to the possibility of forfeiture for not working. If
patent rights advocates are successful in their current lobbying efforts to
restrict compulsory licensing, they may be faced with a "backlash" of
local working requirements. It is my hope, that by demonstrating the
continued possibility of local working, strong patents rights advocates
will push less hard for the eradication of compulsory licences.

123 For example, in 1969, Canada amended the PatentAct to allow compulsory licensees to
import pharmaceuticals to supply the local market: see supra note 84.
124 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Texts relating to provisions concerning working obligations and
sanctions against non-working and other abuses of the patent monopoly
in the various Convention Texts:
ParisConvention, 1883:
Article 5
(1) The importation by the patentee into the country where the patent
has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the States of the
Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Nevertheless, the patentee shall remain under the obligation to
exploit his patent in accordance with the laws of the country into which
he introduces the patented articles.
The Brussels Revision, 1900:
Article 5
(1) (identical to the 1883 text)
(2) (identical to the 1883 text)
Final Protocol
3bis The patentee in each country shall not forfeit his patent for nonworking until after a minimum period of three years from the filing of
the application in the country in question and in case he cannot justify
his inaction.
The Washington Revision, 1911:
Article 5
(1) The importation by the patentee into the country where the patent
has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the
Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
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(2) Nevertheless, the patentee shall remain under the obligation to
exploit his patent in accordance with the laws of the country into which
he introduces the patented articles, but with the restriction that the
patent may not b6 forfeited for nonworking in one of the countries of
the Union until after a period of three years of the date of filing the
application in that country and only in case the patentee cannot justify
his inaction.
The Hague Revision, 1925:
Article 5
(1) (identical to the 1911 text)
(2) Nevertheless, each contracting country shall have the right to take
the necessary legislative measures to prevent the abuses which might
result from the exclusive rights conrerred by the patent, for example,
failure to work.
(3) These measures shall not provide for forfeiture or the patent unless
the grant of compulsory licenses is insufficient to prevent such abuses.
(4) In any case, the patent may not be subjected to such measures before
the expiration of at least three years from the date of grant, or if the
patentee proves the existence of legitimate excuses.
The London Revision, 1934:
Article 5(A)
(1) The importation by the patentee into the country where the patent
has been granted of objects manuractured in any of the countries of the
Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Nevertheless, each of the countries of the Union shall have the right
to take the necessary legislative measures to prevent the abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent, for example, failure to work.
(3) These measures will only provide for the revocation of the patent if
the granting of compulsory licenses shall not suffice to prevent these
abuses.
(4) In any case an application for the grant of a compulsory license may
not be granted before the expiration of three years from the date of the
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grant of the patent, and this license may be granted only if the patentee
fails to justify himself by legitimate reasons. No proceedings for the
forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the
expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license.
The Lisbon Revision, 1958
Article A
(1) (identical to the 1934 text)
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent for example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be prescribed except in cases where
the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent such abuses. No proceeding for the forfeiture or revocation of a
patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the
grant of the first compulsory license.
(4) An application for a compulsory license may not be made on the
ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of
a period of four years from the filing of the patent application or three
years from the date of the grant of the patent whichever period last
expires; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by
legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and
shall not be transferable even in the form of the grant of a sublicense,
except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill using such a license.
The Stockholm Revision, 1967
Article 5
A. (1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has
been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the
Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.
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(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases
where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent the said abuses. No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation
of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the
grant of the first compulsory license.
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure
to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from
the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall
be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.
Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not be
transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with
that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.
(5) The foregoing provisions shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to
utility models.

